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ABSTRACT
PROTECTING NETWORK PROCESSORS WITH HIGH PERFORMANCE LOGIC
BASED MONITORS
MAY 2013
HARIKRISHNAN KUMARAPILLAI CHANDRIKAKUTTY
B.Tech, COLLEGE OF ENGINEERING, TRIVANDRUM, INDIA
M.S. E.C.E., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Russell G. Tessier

Technological advancements have transformed the way people interact with the world.
The Internet now forms a critical infrastructure that links different aspects of our life like
personal communication, business transactions, social networking, and advertising. In order
to cater to this ever increasing communication overhead there has been a fundamental shift in
the network infrastructure. Modern network routers often employ software programmable
network processors instead of ASIC-based technology for higher throughput performance and
adaptability to changing resource requirements. This programmability makes networking
infrastructure vulnerable to new class of network attacks by compromising the software on
network processors. This issue has resulted in the need for security systems which can
monitor the behavior of network processors at run time.
This thesis describes an FPGA-based security monitoring system for multi-core
network processors. The implemented security monitor improves upon previous hardware
monitoring schemes. We demonstrate a state machine based hardware programmable monitor
which can track program execution flow at run time. Applications are analyzed offline and a
hash of the instructions is generated to form a state machine sequence. If the state machine
deviates from expected behavior, an error flag is raised, forcing a network processor reset.
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For testing purposes, the monitoring logic along with the multi-core network processor
system is implemented in FPGA logic. In this research, we modify the network processor
memory architecture to improve security monitor functionality. The efficiency of this
approach is validated using a diverse set of network benchmarks. Experiments are performed
on the prototype system using known network attacks to test the performance of the
monitoring subsystem. Experimental results demonstrate that out security monitor approach
provides an efficient monitoring system in detecting and recovering from network attacks
with minimum overhead while maintaining line rate packet forwarding. Additionally, our
monitor is capable of defending against attacks on processor with a Harvard architecture, the
dominant contemporary network processor organization. We demonstrate that our monitor
architecture provides no network slowdown in the absence of an attack and provides the
capability to drop packets without otherwise affecting regular network traffic when an attack
occurs.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Communication is an essential aspect of modern human society. Rapid advancements
in modern technology have brought about significant improvements in fields of personal
communication, business transactions, entertainment, and digital government. The Internet
forms a central aspect in many of these communication requirements. This ever growing
dependence on the Internet has resulted in the need to improve different attributes of
communication infrastructure like network functionality, throughput performance, reliability
and security. The growth of Internet usage based on data from the International
Telecommunications Union is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Internet Users per 100 Inhabitants [1]

There has been a fundamental shift in network infrastructure in order to support the
need for high performance routing resources. Network routers constitute the core of network
infrastructure and perform most of the packet processing applications. The lack of flexibility,
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programmability and manageability of existing network routers, implemented using
application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) technology, highlights the need to consider
other networking infrastructures. The need to experiment and adapt newer networking
protocols and services has resulted in a shift to software programmable network processor
based systems [29]. Network processors [10] have multiple processor cores that can be
programmed to adapt to different networking requirements. The software programmability of
network processor also makes it vulnerable to network attacks. This inherent vulnerability
can be exploited to generate in-network denial of service attacks, as illustrated in Figure 2.
packet processing system in data plane
network processor

processor
core

memory

interconnect

processor
core

endsystem

processor

memory

off-chip memory

off-chip memory

memory interface

processor
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memory interface

control
processor

memory

core
attack

I/O interface

network interface

switch fabric interface
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router

router

endsystem
router

router

router

Internet

endsystem

Figure 2: Attack on packet processing system in network router data plane [33]

The existing network security mechanisms for end systems like virus scanners and
firewalls are not suitable for network processor based systems since these mechanisms need
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the support of operating systems. Network processors can benefit from dedicated monitors
that can quickly and efficiently detect attacks with minimum resource overhead. A novel
hardware based monitoring strategy has been proposed to reduce the vulnerability of network
processor based systems [2] [3]. These hardware monitors keep track of program execution
flow in the processor. Processor operation is compared to expected program behavior using
information stored in the monitor memory. Any deviation from the expected behavior is
detected and suitable recovery procedures are initiated. The experimental results highlight
the benefits of using hardware monitors for monitoring network processor systems, like fast
attack detection and low overhead.
Although the potential of hardware security monitors has been demonstrated in
previous approaches, there is still room for improvement in terms of monitor detection
accuracy, resource utilization and attack detection speed. Moreover, in multi-core network
processor systems, there is an opportunity for sharing monitor resources when multiple
processors execute the same application. In this document we present a programmable logic
based monitoring system for monitoring multi-core network processor systems. The specific
contributions of this work are:
1. The design of a high-performance programmable security monitor which uses hashes of
network processor instructions to detect unintended processor behaviour. The application
is analyzed offline and an efficient state machine is created which tracks program
execution during runtime. If an expected sequence of instructions (represented as hash
values) is not followed, an execution error is detected. The state machine can be
implemented as either a non-deterministic finite automaton (NFA) or a deterministic finite
automaton (DFA). In this research, we investigate security monitors based on DFA state
machine implementations [6] [7].
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2. A single-core network processor system with security monitor is implemented on an
Altera DE4 system. The competence of our proposed system to detect known network
attacks is evaluated.
3. We evaluated the resource requirements and throughput performance of our proposed
architecture using a diverse set of networking benchmarks [43].
4. Network attacks on network processors based on Harvard architecture [47] are
considered. We demonstrate an in-network attack through the data plane of the network
that exploits an integer overflow vulnerability to smash the processor stack and launch a
return-to-library attack. This attack propagates the attack packet and crashes the processor
system. We also show that our hardware monitor is effective in defending against this
attack and allowing for continued router operation after attack identification and recovery.
1.1. Organization of the document
The rest of the thesis document is organized as follow. Chapter 2 provides a detailed
overview on the general background of network processors, hardware security monitors and
the related work in this field. Chapter 3 describes two previous hardware security monitoring
approaches and the subsequent improvements introduced in the work. Chapter 4 describes the
four-core system architecture with security monitors. Chapter 5 explains the experimental
setup for testing the prototype system. Chapter 6 discusses the benchmarks and the obtained
results. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with directions for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In this chapter, an overview of the technologies needed to perform the proposed
research is provided. These technologies include field-programmable gate array (FPGA)
chips, embedded systems based on FPGAs, and network processors.
2.1. Field-programmable gate array
A field-programmable gate array is a semiconductor device that can be programmed
by a user after it is manufactured. FPGAs contain programmable components called logic
blocks and a hierarchy of interconnect elements (wires) which can be configured to connect
these logic blocks, as illustrated in Figure 3. Hardware description languages (HDL), such as
Verilog and VHDL, can be used to configure the device for implementing specific
applications. Modern FPGAs also provide high speed transceivers, embedded memory blocks
and high-speed I/Os that help perform complex computational operations [8]. Compared to
application specific integrated technology, FPGAs allow for rapid prototyping, faster
debugging, ability for easy reprogramming and shorter time to market.

Figure 3: Structure of an FPGA [9]
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2.2. Network Processors
The tremendous growth of modern communication infrastructure, such as the Internet,
has resulted in the need for networking resources that can meet high throughput performance,
flexibility and security. Even though general purpose processors (GPP) can support newlyintroduced networking protocols and services, they often do not provide high throughput
performance. ASIC processors can provide high throughput but generally do not allow
straightforward functionality changes. Network processors (NP) represent the design space
between these two approaches, as illustrated in Figure 4.

Performance

ASIC

NP

GPP

Programmability

Figure 4: Processor design space
Network processors have multiple embedded processor cores which are software
programmable to provide real time programmability and high throughput performance. The
architecture of a simple network processor is illustrated in Figure 5.
Network processors consist of multiple processing elements and memory units
connected by an on-chip network [10]. A control system determines the interaction between
processors and memory elements and the processing required. Based on the workload,
6

software on network processors can be changed to adapt to the processor operation. There are
different performance metrics that need to be considered while designing network processors
like cost, throughput performance, and power [11] [12]. With promising technologies, like
network virtualization, for future internet architectures emerging, significant research is
ongoing on network processor based systems [13] [14] [15].

Instruction
Memory
Embedded
Embedded
Processor
Embedded
Processor
Processor

Data
Memory
Packet
Buffers

Figure 5: Simple network processor architecture
2.3. Secure monitoring
The software programmability of network processors raises a serious security
concern. Network processor systems are vulnerable to network attacks that can remotely
exploit their programmable nature. In this section, we look at some network attacks and the
existing monitoring techniques for guarding against these attacks.
2.3.1. Network attacks
Network attacks [16] [17] [18] [19] exploit the vulnerabilities in network systems.
Sniffing or snooping are network attacks which allow intruders to listen to or interpret traffic.
If packets are not properly encrypted, sniffing attacks can give a full view of the ongoing
communications. This attack can be used to read the data or cause the network to crash or
become corrupted. Distributed denial-of-service attacks [20] occur when an attacker takes
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control of a large number of machines and installs attack software in them. These machines
can then be used to bombard target attack sites with a large number of messages. This attack
can result in preventing normal system usage and can also lead to the abnormal behavior of
applications or services. Identity spoofing is another common network attack. Here, an
attacker uses special programs to construct IP packets that appear to originate from valid
addresses. This attack can also be used in combination with denial-of service attacks. The
attacker can first take down an existing network connection between two end systems by
denial of service attacks. A new connection can then be initiated with one of the end systems
by sequence number guessing. The attackers can then modify, reroute or delete the data after
taking control of network traffic. A routing attack is another kind of network attack which
reroutes network traffic through attack systems.
2.3.2. Software based monitoring techniques
There are many existing software techniques for protecting network systems against
attacks. Firewalls [21] and virus scanners are the most common solutions for Internet security
[22]. Firewalls help in filtering out traffic that might be harmful. This filtering can happen at
IP packet level, TCP session level or at the application level. Firewalls examine incoming
packets and filters out malformed or attack packets. They are useful against spoofing attacks
and denial-of-service attacks. Virus scanners are examples of intrusion detection systems [23].
These systems are devices or software applications that detect the presence of malicious
traffic or services. Firewalls try to prevent intrusions which originate from outside the
network. Intrusion detection systems detect suspected intrusions that have taken place and
look for attacks being generating from inside the network. Another security measure is the
use of encrypted packets for data communication. Here, cryptographic techniques are used to
encrypt the data while in transmit. Communication is implemented using Internet Protocol
Security (IPSec), a set of open Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) standards. The
8

encrypted packets have the same format as unencrypted packets and they are transmitted on
the existing network framework.
2.3.3. Hardware based monitoring techniques
Existing security mechanisms, like virus scanners and firewalls, generally require
powerful processors and operating systems. These resources are generally not associated with
network routers on programmable network processors. Instead, hardware monitors can be
used to protect network processors against vulnerabilities, as illustrated in Figure 6. Monitors
use run time processing information to look for deviations from expected processor behavior.
If an attack occurs, a deviation from the expected behavior is detected and a suitable recovery
process is initiated. In this thesis project, we introduce a new programmable logic based
security monitoring technique for detecting network attacks. In the next two sections we
describe two FPGA-based systems which can be used to prototype such a system.

Instruction
Memory
Embedded
Embedded
Embedded
Processor
Processor
Processor

Run time
information

Comparison
logic

Data
Memory
Packet
Buffers

Hardware
monitor

Recovery
measures

Expected program
behaviour

Figure 6: Network processor system with hardware monitor
2.4. NetFPGA 1G Infrastructure
The NetFPGA 1G [24] is a programmable platform for networking research that can
operate at 1 Gbits per second line rate. The platform is actively used in networking research
with more than 2000 boards deployed worldwide. The system includes a Xilinx Virtex II pro
[25] based FPGA which can be configured to perform different networking applications.
These applications include a reference router, a packet generator, and a network interface.
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2.5. Altera DE4 NetFPGA infrastructure
Although the NetFPGA 1G is widely used, its logic capacity is limited, making it
unsuitable for research for this project. The Altera DE4 NetFPGA [37] platform is a suitable
alternative. This infrastructure will be heavily used for this thesis project. Important
components of the design including the Altera DE4 board, the DE4 NetFPGA software
infrastructure, and the reference router and packet generator modules, are described
subsequently since they are referenced in our discussion of the proposed security architecture
in coming chapters.
2.5.1. Altera DE4 FPGA board
The Altera DE4 FPGA board [26] is a research platform featuring an Altera Stratix IV
FPGA [27]. The DE4 board which will be used to complete the work described in this thesis
is shown in Figure 7. The main features of the DE4 board are:
 Stratix IV FPGA with 5x more logic and memory resources compared to a NetFPGA 1G

platform.
 PCI Express interface which allow for faster host PC to FPGA data transfers.
 Up to 8GB external DDR2 memory .
2.5.2. Altera DE4 NetFPGA Infrastructure
Altera DE4 NetFPGA is an open source port of the NetFPGA 1G infrastructure to an
Altera DE4 board. The DE4 NetFPGA provides network researchers with a powerful open
platform to build complex network applications. A high-level view of the DE4 NetFPGA
architecture is illustrated in Figure 8. We have successfully migrated the NetFPGA reference
router [44] and packet generator [45] designs to the Altera DE4 platform.
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Figure 7: Altera DE4 board
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Figure 8: Altera DE4 NetFPGA Architecture
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2.5.3. Altera DE4 NetFPGA reference router
The Altera DE4 reference router system integrates the NetFPGA reference router
pipeline with Altera DE4 NetFPGA platform. The Altera DE4 NetFPGA reference router
system is illustrated in the Figure 9.

MAC
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CPU
RxQ

MAC
RxQ

CPU
RxQ

MAC
RxQ

CPU
RxQ

MAC
RxQ

CPU
RxQ

CPU
TxQ

MAC
TxQ

CPU
TxQ

Input Arbiter

Output port lookup

Output Queues

MAC
TxQ

CPU
TxQ

MAC
TxQ

CPU
TxQ

MAC
TxQ

Figure 9: Reference router pipeline

The incoming packets from DE4 GigE MAC ports are stored in input queues (MAC
RxQ and CPU RxQ). The input arbiter then forwards these packets to the output port lookup
module. The output port look up module performs the network router operation. The output
queues forward the packets to corresponding output MAC ports (MAC TxQ and CPU TxQ).
The multi-core network processor system is implemented as part of the Altera DE4 NetFPGA
reference router pipeline, as explained in section 4.5.
2.5.4. Altera DE4 NetFPGA packet generator
Altera DE4 NetFPGA packet generator application allows for packet generation and
forwarded packet capture at line rate. The packet generator also provides packet transfer
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transmit and receive statistics. The Altera NetFPGA packet generator is used for testing the
prototype system functionality, as explained in section 5.2.
2.6. Related work
Modern high-speed network infrastructures utilize network processors since they offer
sophisticated packet processing capabilities and advanced protocol functionality. The
programmable nature of network processors allows for experimentation with new
architectures and protocols [10]. Research projects have examined improving network
processor throughput, resource management, power analysis, packet classification, and
deployment [28] [29]. Network processor based routers are commercially deployed by many
major device vendors (e.g., Intel IXP2400 [30], Cisco QuantumFlow [31], Cavium Octeon
[32]).
Network processor systems are vulnerable to remote attacks that target the software
on the processors. Chasaki et al. [33] demonstrated how network processor systems can be
exploited to launch denial-of-service attacks by using a single malformed packet. Protecting a
network infrastructure against such malicious attacks is an important concern in network
processor design. Hardware-assisted run-time monitoring techniques have been used in
protecting embedded processors. Arora et al. [4] [34] showed how dedicated hardware
monitors can be used to track and prevent unintended program behavior. The hardware
monitor observes the run time execution of the processor and compares it with statically
analyzed expected program behavior. Unexpected behavior is used to initiate appropriate
response mechanisms. Mao et al. [35] used hardware monitors with offline analyzed control
flow graph information to protect embedded processors.
The embedded nature of network processors allows for the use of hardware
monitoring schemes against in-system attacks. Wolf et al. [36] proposed using a secure
packet processing platform for network processors with hardware monitors. Using offline
13

analyzed monitoring graphs, the program execution of packet processors can be monitored
for attacks and suitable recovery measures taken. Chasaki et al. [2] have implemented a
hardware security monitoring model that can detect known network attacks.
2.7. Summary
This chapter introduced several concepts that are essential for understanding the
prototype system. We provide an overview of the Altera DE4 NetFPGA infrastructure used
for development and testing of the prototype system. Although hardware security monitoring
systems for network processors exist, there is still potential for improvement. The next
chapter outlines two specific previous monitoring approaches that are limited in their
capabilities. Subsequent chapters describe enhancements to overcome these limitations.
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CHAPTER 3
SECURITY MONITOR SYSTEM REVIEW
This chapter introduces two previous hardware security monitoring techniques for
network processors. We will first look at the implementation details of an existing hardware
security monitor [2]. The limitations of this hardware security monitor motivate us to develop
a programmable hardware security monitor. We will compare the advantages and drawbacks
of these two security monitoring approaches. Based on these observations, we outline the
important security monitoring features implemented in the new monitoring system presented
in this thesis.
To provide a basis for comparing the two approaches, we state the main design
challenges that need to be met when using hardware security monitors.
1. Correct detection: The monitoring system needs to correctly identify malicious attacks.
There is a variety of information available for security monitors to keep track of processor
operation at run time:


Instruction address: The security monitor can follow the instruction addresses of
the application binary, since the feasible address sequences can often be
predetermined.



Opcode: The security monitor can track the operations performed by the
processor.



Instruction hash: The monitor can use a sequence of instruction hash values to
verify processor behaviour.

The main tradeoff for choosing a monitoring strategy depends on the availability of
hardware resources and the difficulty in defeating the effectiveness of the monitoring
behavior by an attacker. The security monitor can utilize one or more of the above
mentioned monitoring options to correctly detect unintended behavior.
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2. Resource overhead: Security monitors need to be designed while considering the limited
resource availability of their implementation platform. Increasing the resource usage can
adversely affect power consumption and design complexity.
3. Fast detection: Programmable network processor operation can be changed by altering the
software on the processor. Hence, it is desirable to detect malicious behaviour quickly,
preferably within one or a small number of clock cycles.
3.1 Address-based hardware security monitor system
An address-based hardware security monitor [2] uses instruction address information
for monitoring processor behavior. The processor application binary is analyzed offline and
instructions are classified into different basic blocks. Each basic block represents a set of
instructions, before a branch instruction is encountered as illustrated in Figure 10.
Non conditional
instruction

1
2
3

Basic block 0

Conditional
jump instruction

4
Non conditional
jump instruction

5
6
7

Basic block 1

8
9
Basic block 2
11
12

Basic block 3

Figure 10: Basic block representation
The fifth instruction is a conditional jump instruction, and hence all instructions from
memory locations 1 to 5 represent basic block zero. Similarly, instruction eight is an
unconditional jump instruction. All instructions from memory locations 6 to 8 represent basic
16

block one and so on. The basic block information for each instruction is used to validate the
processor operation at runtime.
The high level architecture of the address-based hardware security monitor system is
illustrated in Figure 11.
BRAM index
BRAM
Basic
block

32-bit
processor
address

Next Basic
block

Next-hop
address

Next
hop

BRAM
Index
generator

Stage 1

Current
Basic
block

Basic
block

Current basic
block
Previous
Basic
block
Current
Basic
block

Stage 2
Stage 3
Stage 4

≠?

FIFO
Controller

FIFO
wr_en

≠?

Error

Error

Previous
block

rd_en

Figure 11: Address-based hardware security monitor architecture [2]
3.2. Address-based hardware monitor operation
The address-based hardware security monitor system is fashioned as a four stage
pipeline. Each pipeline stage takes one clock cycle to complete. In the first stage the
instruction address of the currently executed instruction in the processor is used to index a
block RAM (BRAM). The BRAM outputs the basic block number of the instruction as well
as the next-hop address, if there is one. In the second stage, we forward the basic block
number to the third stage. At the same time, the basic block number output is stored in a
FIFO block. During the third stage of the monitor operation, the current basic block number
input from the second stage as well as the block information for the just completed
instruction from the FIFO block are compared. If they are the same, the instructions belong to
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the same basic block and the currently executed instruction is valid. If not, check if the
instruction is within the next basic block, which is a valid basic block jump (e.g. jump from
basic block 0 to basic block 1). If not, a check is required to determine whether the currently
executed instruction belongs to the basic block which contains the target instruction for a
jump. During the fourth stage the next-hop address for the just completed instruction is used
to once again index the basic block memory. If the basic block for this target is the same as
the basic block of the currently-executed instruction, a valid instruction sequence is
determined. Otherwise, an error signal is generated to stop processor operation.
3.2.1. System components
3.2.1.1. BRAM index generator module
The BRAM index generator module generates the index output to address the basic
block memory (BRAM) from the 32-bit processor instruction address. The first instruction
address from the processor represents address zero of the BRAM. This is used as the base
address to generate remaining index outputs.
3.2.1.2. FIFO controller module
The FIFO controller module generates the write signal to store the current basic block
information and the read signal to read the basic block information of the just completed
instruction.
3.2.1.3. Basic block memory (BRAM)
Each element in the basic block memory (BRAM) corresponds to an instruction in the
program sequence and is indexed by an instruction address of the application. The basic
block memory contains two entries per index, the basic block number to which each
instruction belongs and the next-hop address to where the instruction could jump. The nexthop address entry is empty for unconditional instructions.
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3.2.1.4. Basic block FIFO
The basic block FIFO stores the basic block numbers of the just completed and
currently executed instructions, as read from the basic block memory. These values are used
to keep track of the processor execution path.
3.3. Limitations of address-based hardware security monitor.
The basic block monitoring strategy for tracking processor behavior does not directly
validate individual instructions as they are executed by the processor. For example, malicious
instructions can go undetected if the instructions belong to the same basic block as the
expected instructions, as illustrated in Figure 12. In this example, malicious instructions (2
and 3) will not be detected as long as they follow the program memory address execution
sequence. Moreover, the inclusion of a next-hop address field, which is required only for
branch instructions, with the basic block information for all instructions in the basic block
memory increases on-chip memory utilization. To reduce memory utilization, the basic block
memory can be shared using multiple read ports. For example, the basic block memory can
be read simultaneously during both stage 4 and stage 1 of the pipeline. Such sharing does not
allow basic block memory sharing across multiple hardware monitors when multiple network
processor cores execute the same program. So, in multi-core network processor systems,
separate address-based hardware security monitors need to be generated when the processors
execute the same application.
3.4. Programmable security monitor using instruction hashing
The limitations of the fixed hardware security monitor motivate us to develop a new
monitoring strategy which can validate individual instructions and reduce the embedded
memory usage for the monitor.
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Figure 13: Programmable security monitor architecture
3.4.1. Programmable logic monitor operation
The operation of the programmable logic monitor relies on compile-time analysis of
the program binary. An analysis tool determines the expected hash values for the binary and
generates the Verilog files needed to synthesize the programmable security monitor,
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including the jump logic. As shown in Figure 13, the programmable logic monitor
infrastructure is fashioned as a three stage pipeline flow. Each 32-bit binary instruction
executed by the processor is input to the monitor. The first stage of security monitor
generates the four bit hash value from this 32-bit instruction. In the second stage, two parallel
operations are performed.


The four bit hash value from the hash memory is fetched.



The hash value is evaluated in the jump module. If the hash value does not match one of
the target hash values for the jump, an error signal is generated indicating that an
incorrect instruction has been executed.
In third stage, for unconditional instructions, a comparison is made between hash

value computed from stage 1 and the value retrieved from hash memory. A reset signal is
generated if there is a mismatch or if stage 2 generated an error signal.
3.4.2. System components
3.4.2.1. Hash function module
The hash function module computes a multi-bit hash value for the 32-bit processor
instruction. In our initial experimentation we use a hash function which generates a modulo16 value from the sum of all individual bits in the instruction to form a four-bit hash value.
3.4.2.2. Hash memory module
The hash memory module is a 2-port ROM block that stores the hash values generated
during offline analysis. The hash values are used to keep track of processor behaviour during
run time.
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3.4.2.3. Jump logic module
The jump logic module provides the next-hop hash memory addresses for branch
instructions when a branch is taken. The processor typically executes three different types of
instructions.
1. An unconditional instruction is followed by execution of the next consecutive instruction
in the processor memory.
1. An unconditional branch instruction will result in a jump to a non-consecutive memory
location in instruction memory.
2. A conditional branch instruction can result in a jump to a new address location following
the evaluation of the branch condition. If the branch is not taken, the next consecutive
instruction is executed.
Since a branch condition for a conditional branch instruction can only be evaluated at
run time, both possible hash values for target address locations need to be considered by the
jump logic module. During runtime, the hash values of the instruction after the conditional
branch are compared with the possible hash values of the branch targets to determine if a
valid instruction is being executed. The jump logic module then determines the address in the
hash memory for the appropriate target instruction.
3.4.2.4. Control module
The control module (the multiplexer and +1 adder) determines the address for the
hash memory. For unconditional instructions, the hash value for the next instruction is stored
in the next consecutive address location. In case of conditional instructions, the address value
for the hash memory is output from the jump module.
3.4.2.5. Programmable security monitor advantages
The key improvements of the programmable security monitor using instruction hashing over
the address-based monitor include:
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1. The programmable security monitor uses a hash of each instruction to monitor processor
behaviour instead of storing basic block information for each instruction. A hash value is
computed for each program instruction and stored in a hash memory. As instructions are
executed, the hash of the currently-executed instruction is compared against a stored hash
value for the instruction. The hash value of the first instruction is located in hash memory
at location 0x0, the second at 0x1, and so forth. A state counter is used to point to the
hash of the currently executed instruction. The strength of the monitoring scheme
improves with hash value bit width since the probability of hash collisions (collision
probability is 1/2x, where x is the number of bits) is reduced. To keep hardware
requirements reasonable, the width of the hash values is constrained to the minimum size
which allows the required security. A four-bit hash value is chosen for monitoring
purposes as this size provides a strong monitoring pattern (collision probability 0.0625)
which limits memory overhead.
2. Next instruction addresses for conditional instructions are determined in the jump logic,
reducing memory resource utilization. Combinational logic is used to determine the
address of the next location in the hash memory for conditional instructions which are
taken. For conditional instructions where a branch is not taken or for unconditional
instructions, the next desired location in the hash memory is the next consecutive location
in the memory.
3. The design of the programmable security monitor allows for sharing of the hash memory
monitoring resource. The hash values are stored in a 2-port ROM memory block which is
utilized only once during each instruction evaluation cycle. The two ports allow for the
sharing of the hash memory, a critical resource, by two monitors that are evaluating the
same executing program.
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3.5. Limitations of programmable security monitor
The jump logic module can require significant logic resource utilization. The
instruction at memory location 0 is a conditional jump instruction, with next-hop address
location (1 or 4) evaluated based on the hash values (x and y). An offline analysis tool
generates a state machine to perform this evaluation, initiated every time the memory address
input is zero. Once a next state (1 or 4) is reached, the state machine will continue to
evaluate. If there are n conditional branch instructions (with 2 next states), 2n possible state
transitions need to be considered. Additionally since the jump logic is implemented in logic,
we need to re-synthesize the design for each different application.
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Figure 14: Jump logic implementation
3.6. Comparison of address-based hardware and programmable monitors
3.6.1. Resource overhead
We compared the resource utilization of the programmable security monitor to the
address-based hardware security monitor technique. Table 1 provides the comparison results
from MiBench [42][42] benchmarks and two other packet processing applications (IPV4 [39]
and CM [40]). Since the next-hop addresses are not stored in block memory, the
programmable security monitor approach results in a considerable reduction in memory
utilization compared to the fixed hardware monitoring technique. The logic resources
(ALUTs and registers) show a considerable increase in the programmable security monitor
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approach with program size, which results from the jump logic implementation illustrated in
Figure 14.
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Table 1: Resource utilization comparison
3.7. Memory based programmable security monitor approach
This section presents an introduction to a memory based technique for representing
hash based state machines. Figure 15 illustrates a hash based state machine. Here (0,1,2,3,4...)
represent the states and (a,b,c,d...) represent the input (hash values) to the states. The state
machine is traversed based on the current state and the hash input.
Consider such a state machine with a two bit hash input. For any state there are at
most four outgoing edges possible based on the input values (00, 01, 10, 11). A naïve way to
store the state machine in RAM would be to store each state and all possible edge transitions
as illustrated in Figure 16. The current state and the input hash pattern can be used to index
the memory to find the next state transition. Since for most states, the next state transition
may not be present for all input patterns, a valid bit is provided to verify the state transition.
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For example in Figure 15, state 0 has only 1 state transition, state 2 hash 2 transitions, state3
has 3 transitions and so on.
4
c
a

b

0

1

2
d
3

e

5
f
6
g
7

Figure 15: DFA state machine

V

Next state
Next state
State 0

State

Input
State 1
If V = 1

State 2

Hash input

Figure 16: DFA single memory representation
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The memory representation illustrated in Figure 16 is not a cost effective solution
since it results in a large number of unused memory locations. This is since there is a memory
location for each possible input combination. An alternative solution is to provide separate
memory logic for multiple next states as illustrated in Figure 17. For example in Figure 15 ,
for states (0, 1 and 2) we index only a single memory (memory for one state). When state 2 is
indexed, the jump bit (J) is set high to indicate more than 1 next state. In the next step we
index all the parallel memory blocks (memory for multiple states) simultaneously. If the valid
bit (V) is set and the hash input matches (either c or d), we move to the corresponding state
(either 3 or 4). For a four bit hash input we need 16 parallel memory blocks.

Memory for
multiple
states

Hash J Next state

Hash J V Next state

Hash J V Next state

Yes

State
If J = 1

No
If V = 1
If V = 1
Next state
logic

RAM1
Memory for
one state

Hash input

Figure 17: DFA parallel memory representation
The memory representation illustrated in Figure 17, requires simultaneous memory
access (2h, where h is the input bit width) and in many cases there are unused memory
locations. We need a compact solution which requires only single memory lookup during
every state transition and does not result in unused memory locations. Thus, state transitions
need to be implemented with no more than one memory access per instruction (to keep up
with the network processor core) and be as compact as possible (to minimize the
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implementation overhead of the monitor). In the next chapter we introduce the proposed
security monitoring approach which presents a compact solution to represent a state machine
in memory.
3.8. Conclusion
Based on the two monitoring techniques mentioned above, we outline the following
important features of the two monitoring approaches:
1. Four-bit instruction hashes can be utilized to monitor processor behaviour since it provides
a compact representation for each instruction.
2. It is desirable to limit or eliminate target instruction address locations for conditional
branches.
3. The evaluation circuitry for incorrect hash values should be efficiently implemented. In
the programmable monitor case, this circuitry is implemented using combinational logic.
In the next chapter, a memory-based implementation is presented.
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CHAPTER 4
SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
In this chapter, we present a new high performance security monitor system for multicore network processors. The generation of security monitors for a multi-core system begins
with the offline analysis of packet processing application binaries. In this chapter we describe
an automated process to generate these binaries and configure available monitors fashioned
from hardware. We implemented our prototype system as part of a reference router on the
Altera DE4 NetFPGA platform. This chapter describes the individual components in the
development of the prototype system.
4.1. Memory based programmable security monitor architecture
The high level view of our proposed memory based programmable security monitor
architecture is illustrated in Figure 18.
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Figure 18: Memory based programmable security monitor architecture
We introduce the following enhancements over the previous two security monitor
models.
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1. The processor operation is monitored using four-bit instruction hashes. The limitations of
address-based hardware monitoring scheme, as explained in section 3.3, motivated this
choice. This change allows the validation of individual instructions, and reduces the
embedded memory usage of the monitor.
2. The programmable security monitor scheme discussed in previous chapter suffers from
logic increase in the jump logic unit due to a need to determine next hop addresses for the
hash memory, as illustrated in section 3.5. Additionally it requires re-synthesizing the
design for different application. In order to overcome these issues, we utilize a memory
based approach to store hash values. This will provide for a more compact monitor
solution.
4.1.2. Memory based programmable security monitor operation
The information that needs to be stored in the monitoring memory is illustrated on the
left side of Figure 19. Each state represents an instruction and an outgoing transition edge
from this state represents the hash value of the next expected instruction in the execution
sequence. For example, the state c has two next states, d and e, with hash values 11 and 3,
respectively.
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Figure 19: Grouping of states
Our main idea to compactly represent DFA states with varying numbers of outgoing
edges is to encode all the necessary information in a single table entry and to group states by
the number of outgoing edges. The main challenge in achieving compactness is to allocate
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exactly the amount of memory that is needed for each state to store next state information
while still being able to index this memory without degrading to a linear search. In our
representation, we group states if they have same previous state. A state belongs to group g if
the previous state has g outgoing edges. For a monitor with 4-bit hash value, there are 16
possible groups. For example, in Figure 19 on the right side, groups are shown with different
colors. Note that a state can belong to multiple groups (e.g., state f belongs to group 2
(because a has two outgoing edges, one to b and one to f) and to group 3 (because e has three
outgoing edges)).
The memory contains tuples of {number of next states, offset in state group, valid
hash values on outgoing edges} and is logically divided into groups. The base addresses for
each group are stored in register file with 16 entries. Within a group the sets of states that
share the previous state are grouped together (e.g., b and f are together and d and e are
together). Within a set, states are ordered by the hash value on the incoming edge (e.g., e
before d because hash value 3 is smaller than hash value 11).
To illustrate the operation of the monitor, we describe an example transition. As
shown in Figure 18, each 32-bit binary instruction executed by the processor is also input to
our security monitor during the fetch stage of the processor. Assume the monitor is in state a
and the processor reports an instruction that leads to a hash value of 7. To perform the
transition, the memory row labeled a is read. The tuple in this row indicates that there are two
outgoing edges. The valid hash values of these two edges are stored in the 16-bit vector. To
verify that the transition is valid, the hash comparison unit checks if bit 7 is set in the bit
vector (which it is). If this bit is not set, then an invalid transition takes place, indicating an
attack, and the processor is reset. After the check, the next state (i.e., state f) in the DFA
needs to be found in memory. To determine the address of that state, the base address of the
group of the next state is looked up in the register file (i.e., 0x002 since the next state belongs
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to group 2). To this base address, the product of the set size (i.e., group number) and the
offset in the state group is added (to index the correct set within this group). Finally, k is
added, which is the position of the matching hash in the bit vector (in our case 1 since 2 is the
first matching hash (i.e., k=0) and 7 is the second matching hash (i.e., k=1)). Thus the
memory location of state f is 0x002 + 2*0 + 1 = 0x003.
Note that any state transition takes only one memory read from state machine memory
and a lookup into a fixed-size register file. The DFA is represented compactly without
wasting any memory slots. Thus, this representation lends itself to high-performance
implementation.
4.1.3. System components
4.1.3.1. Hash function module
The hash function module generates the four bit hash value for the 32-bit processor
instruction. For our experimentation, we used a hash function which generates a modulo-16
value from the sum of all individual bits in the instruction.
4.1.3.2. Group base address module
The group base address module stores the base address of the different groups in the
state machine memory module. The number of states value read from memory is used to
index the group base address module. The corresponding base address value output is
forwarded to the memory index generation module.
4.1.3.3. Valid bit generation module
This module compares the 4-bit hash value generated by the hash function module
with all the read hash values from the memory to determine the position of the matching hash
value. If no hash match occurs, an error signal is generated.
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4.1.3.4. Memory index generation module
This module generates the memory address for indexing the state machine memory
module. The general equation for memory index calculation is base address + number of
states*offset in state group + k. The base address value is generated by the group base
address module, number of states and offset in state group values are read from memory and
k is generated by the valid bit generation module
4.1.3.5. State machine memory module
The state machine memory module stores the hash values and next state values in a
compact manner as explained in section 4.1.2. The RAM block is divided into different
groups, which store the states having same number of next states. Each memory entry
contains tuples of {number of states, offset in state group, valid hash values on outgoing
edges}. For our experimentation we selected a 4096 deep RAM block as the state machine
memory module. So the total size of the state machine memory block is 4096*(4+12+16) =
131K memory bits.
4.2. Offline analysis
The automated offline analysis tool for security monitor generation is illustrated in
Figure 20. The application source code is first passed through a MIPS-GCC compiler. The
compiler generates the 32-bit binary information for each instruction and the branch
information for conditional instructions. The branch information contains all possible target
addresses for the conditional instruction. In our current implementation, all possible branch
targets and return instructions are analyzed at compile time. Then the DFA-to-NFA
conversion starts with a non-deterministic NFA representation obtained from the compiler
information. Through powerset construction, a DFA is constructed. This DFA is then
converted into a memory initialization file and is loaded into the monitor when the processing
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binary is installed in the processor. The NFA to DFA conversion module will be explained in
detail in section 4.3.
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Figure 20: Offline analysis

4.3. Non deterministic finite automata to deterministic finite automata
Tracking nondeterministic finite automata is difficult to implement in practice since
the automaton can have multiple active states. This leads to high bandwidth requirements
between the monitoring logic and the memory that maintains the NFA since next-state
information for all active states has to be fetched in each iteration. As illustrated in Figure 21,
state 4 and 6 can be reached from state 3 for input condition (z). When using a DFA, in
contrast, only one state is active and implementation becomes much easier. During offline
analysis, state assignments must be made so that the control flow is distinct.
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Figure 21: NFA state machine
Powerset construction [50] is a standard method used to convert an NFA to a DFA.
The algorithm for NFA to DFA transformation using powerset construction is illustrated in
Figure 22.
1. The algorithm begins by constructing an NFA state machine, with the each state node
having the following elements: number of inputs, number of outputs, input list and output
list (for example state 3 has number of inputs: 1, number of outputs: 2, input list: [state 2]
and output list: [state 4, state 6]).
2. The algorithm then progresses to check for conditional branch instructions (number of
outputs > 1). In the NFA state machine in Figure 21, states 2, 3, 4 and 7 satisfy this
condition.
3. The algorithm then proceeds to check for states exhibiting NFA property (hash1 = hash2).
In the above example state 3 has two output states (4 and 6) both reachable by the same
input (z), which represents the hash value of the next state. The algorithm replaces states 4
and 6 in the output list of state 3 with a new single state ({4, 6}), distinct for the input
value (z). The node elements of the states involved are updated (state 3 now has number of
inputs: 1, number of outputs: 1, input list: [state 2] and output list: [state {4, 6}]. Similarly
new state {4, 6} has number of inputs: 1, number of outputs: 2, input list: [state 3] and
output list: [state 5, state 7]).
4. This procedure is continued until all outputs of the present state (if there are more than 2
outputs) and all states of the NFA state machine are traversed. Both state 3 and new state
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{4, 6} exhibit NFA properties (for input values z and x respectively). This results in two
additional states being included in the DFA state machine (state {4, 6} and state {5, 7}).
The resulting DFA transformation using Powerset construction for the above NFA
example is shown in Figure 23.
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Figure 22: Powerset construction algorithm
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In Figure 23, the states (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9...) in the state machine represent the
address locations of the hash memory. The hash values (0000 to 1111) are represented by the
inputs to the state machine (x, y, z, a, b, c...).
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Figure 23: DFA state machine using powerset construction

The NFA to DFA transformation using powerset construction can result in states
having more than two next-hop values (e.g. {5, 7}). The proposed security monitor
architecture described in section 4.1 needs to be enhanced to support multiple next-hop
address lookups. As part of the proposed work we will evaluate possible modifications to the
CAM module to accommodate these multiple next-hop address lookups. This transformation
is performed during offline analysis using software to convert the NFA state machine
representation to a DFA representation.
4.4. Network processor core
The high level architecture of our network processor core is illustrated in Figure 24.
The processor core consists of a 32-bit open source embedded Plasma processor [38] which is
implemented in Verilog HDL and based on the MIPS architecture. The Plasma processor
executes all MIPS user mode instructions except unaligned load and store instructions. The
network processor core has a memory unit for storing program binaries and for storing data
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during program execution. It also has packet buffers to store the incoming network packet
data.
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Figure 24: Network processor core

The network processor core integrated with a single security monitor system is shown
in Figure 25. The security monitor keeps track of the instructions executed by the processor
core. A reset signal is generated when a malicious behavior is detected.
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Figure 25: Network processor integrated with security monitor
4.5. Network processor architecture
A high level overview of the single-core network processor system with the security
monitor incorporated in the Altera DE4 NetFPGA pipeline is illustrated in Figure 26. The
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packets arrive at the four Ethernet ports on DE4 board and are inserted into input queues
(MAC RX Q). The input arbiter forwards these packets to the flow classification module. The
flow classifier module assigns the incoming packet data to the network processor core. The
instructions executed by the processor core are input to the monitor subsystem
simultaneously. The security monitor can generate reset signal to the network processor core.
The processed packets are forwarded by the output arbiter to the output queues. The packets
output from the processor system are forwarded by the output queues to the corresponding
MAC transmit ports (MAC TX Q).

Figure 26: Single-core network processor system with security monitor in Altera DE4
NetFPGA pipeline.

4.6. Von Neumann versus Harvard architecture
The MIPS plasma processor used in our proposed network processor design utilizes a
von Neumann [46] memory architecture, as illustrated in Figure 27. In a von Neumann
architecture, a single physical memory is shared by both code and data. The processor does
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not make any distinction between whether the data or code is read or written. A memory
interface arbitrates the memory access between the instruction read and data access.
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Stack

Figure 27: von Neumann architecture

This implementation style of von Neumann architecture makes it inherently
vulnerable to code injection [48] attacks. A typical code injection attack is illustrated in
Figure 28. The processor keeps track of the instructions it executes using the program counter.
In a code injection attack, an attacker initially injects a malicious code into the processor’s
address space and directs the program counter to the address space where the malicious code
resides. Attackers often employ different memory error techniques like stack overflow [52],
format string vulnerability [53] and integer overflow [54] to trigger code injection attacks.
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Figure 28: Code injection attack
In a Harvard architecture [47], the code and data are placed in separate physical
address spaces. The Harvard memory architecture is illustrated in Figure 29. Separate buses
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provide instruction and data access, with each potentially having different word widths,
timing and memory address structures. The processor can perform both the instruction read
and the data memory access at the same time. The instructions are usually stored in read only
memory while data is stored in read-write memory. Since a program counter cannot point to
addresses in the data memory, code injection attacks are difficult to perform in a Harvard
memory architecture. Even if an attacker successfully writes a malicious code in the stack, it
will not be executed.
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Figure 29: Harvard architecture

Even though general memory error techniques (integer overflow, heap overflow etc.)
cannot be used to generate code injection attacks, Francillon et al. [49] demonstrated that
code injection attacks are still feasible on Harvard architecture processors using returnoriented programming technique [55]. Here an attacker sends several specifically crafted
packets to build a malicious stack one byte at a time. Once the stack is built, the attacker
sends another specifically crafted packet that copies the malware to program memory using a
return-oriented programming technique.
As part of the proposed work we evaluated a possible attack on a Harvard architecture
and the ability of our proposed security monitor to detect it. The memory architecture of the
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plasma processor was modified to have separate instruction and data memory. The instruction
memory was made read-only while data memory was made read-write.
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CHAPTER 5
EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH
This chapter describes the experimental approach used for testing the prototype
system. In the first section, we describe how a Harvard architecture attack can be constructed
for the networking environment. The later section discusses the experimental setup,
implemented utilizing Altera DE4 NetFPGA infrastructure. Finally, we outline the different
evaluation metrics used for verifying the prototype system functionality.
5.1. Network attack generation
In this section, we describe how a Harvard memory architecture attack can be
constructed for the networking environment and how our monitor can detect it. Figure 31
shows a portion of congestion management protocol (CM) and IPV4 packet forwarding
application used to build an attack on the network processor system. The network attack used
for testing the prototype system functionality exploits a simple integer overflow vulnerability
of the congestion management [40] protocol application. A congestion management protocol
inserts a custom protocol header in the packet header space between IP header and UDP
header as illustrated in Figure 30.
Original packet
Link
Hdr

IP
Hdr

UDP
Hdr

payload

CM
application
New packet
Link
Hdr

IP
Hdr

CM
Hdr

len1

UDP
Hdr

payload

len2

Figure 30: Congestion management header insertion
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The application during this process needs to make sure the new packet size (len1 +
len2) does not exceed the maximum datagram length. In certain cases, this maximum packet
size check can be exploited to create an integer overflow.

CM protocol

IPV4 application

Figure 31: Integer overflow vulnerable code
The variable sum is of type unsigned short. The CM application uses this variable to
check whether the packet size (sum = len1 + len2) after inserting the custom header has
exceeded the maximum packet size limit (sum > MAX_PKT_SIZE). Any packet which
satisfies the size check is then copied to processor data memory. However, an attacker can
send a carefully crafted malformed UDP packet that can trigger an integer overflow. For
example, an attack packet with malformed UDP length field (16 bit value 0xfffe (decimal
value 65534)) will pass the maximum packet size check (since 65334 + 12 = 10, due to
integer overflow). This will result in 65334 bytes of packet data to be copied to the processor
memory space.
The packet payload of the attack packet is crafted in such a way that the return
address is overwritten to direct the control flow to the IPV4 packet forwarding application
(which is the library code on the processor) and the value of ip_dst_low field is 0xff. The port
information gets updated with this value (the boxed instruction in the IPV4 code), forwarding
the attack packet to all the outgoing ports and then crashing the processor system. As a result,
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the attack packet gets forwarded to all outgoing interfaces before the system crashes, thus
propagating the attack through the network.
5.2. Experimental Setup
The test topology that will be used to verify the performance of our monitoring
system is shown in Figure 32.

Figure 32: Test topology
Altera DE4 packet generator is used to generate network packets, and to capture
packets forwarded from the prototype system. The packet generator tool allows for
customizing the size, the number of iterations, and the throughput rate for the test packet. The
packet generator code is downloaded to one Altera DE4 board. The single core network
processor system with security monitor, integrated along with the Altera DE4 NetFPGA
packet generator pipeline is downloaded to another DE4 board. Ethernet MAC-PHY registers
are configured through the JTAG cable. The experimental test setup is illustrated in Figure 33.

Figure 33: Experimental test setup
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5.3. Evaluation metrics
The prototype system is tested in simulation using a ModelSim-Altera simulator [41],
and in hardware using an Altera Signal-tap logic generator [56]. The different evaluation
metrics for verifying the prototype system are listed below.
1. Throughput performance: Using IPV4 packet forwarding application [39], the singlecore network processor system without that security monitor is tested for throughput
performance for different packet sizes. The single core network processor system with
security monitor illustrated in Figure 26 is tested for throughput performance using the
attack model described in section 5.1.
2. Attack Detection: The prototype system described in Figure 26 is tested for attack
detection capability, using the attack model mentioned in section 5.1. The security monitor
system should detect any unintended processor behaviour and trigger appropriate recovery
mechanisms to the processor.
3. Resource overhead: The resource utilization of the security monitor system is evaluated
using a diverse set of network applications, as explained in next chapter. The resource
savings facilitated by the proposed security approach over existing monitoring schemes is
estimated.
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CHAPTER 6
BENCHMARKS AND EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this chapter we discuss the benchmarks used for testing the network processor
system and the results of the experiments performed on the proposed security monitor
architecture.
6.1. Evaluation benchmarks
Network workloads can be logically divided into data plane workloads and control
plane workloads. The data plane is where data traffic is handled using actions such as packet
forwarding, packet dropping, and encapsulation. The control plane handles complex packet
management tasks like flow management, signaling, and routing updates. Control plane
operations are usually less time critical, while data plane operations take place in real time on
the network data path. Although network processors mostly target data plane applications,
they are equally applicable to control plane operations. NpBench [43] is a benchmark suite
targeting modern network processor applications. The benchmark applications are
categorized into three specific functional groups - traffic management and quality of service
group (TQG), security and media processing group (SMG) and packet processing group
(PPG). The applications in these groups belong to either the data plane, control plane or both.
The TQG benchmark falls in the category of both control plane and data plane processing,
and includes applications related to routing, scheduling, switching, signaling and quality of
service. The SMG benchmark is related to security applications like firewalls, admission
control, encryption algorithms and media processing applications like media trans-coding.
The PPG benchmark includes data plane processing applications like IP packet fragmentation,
packet marking, editing and classification. The proposed network processor architecture will
be evaluated using these diverse benchmark applications. Table 2 summarizes the different
benchmarks provided by NpBench.
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Group

TQG

Applications
Routing

Data
plane
X

Control
plane
X

Scheduling

X

X

Content-based Switching

X

X

Weighted pair queuing

X

X

Traffic shaping

X

X

Load Balancing

X

X

VLAN

SMG

PPG

X

MPLS

X

Block cipher algorithm

X

Message cipher algorithm

X

Firewall application

X

X

IPSec

X

X

Virtual private network

X

X

Public encryption

X

Usage-based accounting

X

H.323

X

Media transcoding

X

Duplicate data suppression

X

IP-packet fragmentation

X

Packet encapsulation

X

Packet marking/editing

X

Packet classification

X

Checksum calculation

X

Table 2: NpBench Benchmark applications [43].
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X

X

X

6.2. Experimental results
6.2.1. Attack Detection
This section explains the experiments performed to test the ability of our proposed
security monitoring system to detect and recover from an attack. We observed the security
monitor operation in simulation using the ModelSim-Altera simulator [41], and in hardware
using an Altera Signal-tap logic generator [56].
6.2.1.1. Network processor without security monitor
We initially tested the single-core network processor operation without the security
monitor system when the attack described in section 5.1 is implemented. Figure 34 shows the
simulation results for the behavior of the processor system. The attack packet was received
through MAC port Rx0, and then forwarded to the network processor. The processor then
forwards the attack packet to all the outgoing ports of the router and then crashes the router.
This behavior was also verified in hardware.

Figure 34: Simulation waveform showing attack packet propagation in the network
processor system.
6.2.1.2. Network processor with security monitor
We then repeated the previous experiment after including the security monitor as
illustrated in Figure 26. Figure 35 shows the simulation results for the behavior of the
network processor system when an attack packet and normal packet are sent simultaneously.
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After the monitor was included, the attack packet was successfully identified, the network
processor was reset, and subsequent normal packets were routed successfully.

Figure 35: Simulation waveform showing the identification of the attack packet and
successful forwarding of the subsequent packet.
6.2.2. Throughput performance
This section explains the experiments performed to measure the throughput of our
proposed network processor system. The experimental setup mentioned in section 5.2 was
implemented to perform these measurements.
6.2.2.1. Single-core network processor throughput performance
The single-core network processor system illustrated in Figure 26 was implemented,
without the security monitor, on the Altera DE4 NetFPGA platform. Using a standard IPV4
packet forwarding application in the processor core, the throughput performance of the
single-core system was tested. Network packets of different packet sizes were generated from
the Altera DE4 packet generator, and send through the 1Gbps MAC ports of the Altera DE4
board. The forwarded packets were received back at the packet generator and the prototype
system’s transmit-receive statistics were measured. The resulting throughput performance is
illustrated in Figure 36.
The throughput of our network processor system improves as the packet size increases.
The packet forwarding application works by comparing destination IP address in each packet
header with IP address values stored in processor memory to select an output port. A
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reduction in packet size increases the per packet processing operation, and thus reduces the
overall throughput performance.

Figure 36: Single-core network processor throughput performance (IPV4)
6.2.2.2. Single-core network processor throughput performance under attack
In this experiment, we evaluate the throughput performance of our single-core
network processor system illustrated in Figure 26 when attack packets are sent
simultaneously along with normal packets. Normal packets are received at one EthernetMAC port (Rx0) of the network processor system; while attack packets are received
simultaneously at another receive port (Rx1). Both normal packets and attack packets are
generated at the same rate from the packet generator system. The forwarded packets are
received back at the packet generator and the throughput is measured. Figure 38 shows the
throughput performance of the network processor system for two different packet sizes for
varying ratios of normal packets to attack packets. The vulnerable application shown in
Figure 31 was used for testing purpose. When no attack packets are send the throughput of
the network processor system increases and reaches a maximum. When attack packets are
included the throughput reaches a maximum, and then decreases slightly before settling down.
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Figure 37: Single-core network processor throughput performance with security
monitor under attack packets
As we increase the ratio of the attack packets sent to the processor system, the overall
throughput of the system is reduced. This effect occurs because whenever an attack packet is
detected, the security monitor generates a reset signal. The network processor and the packet
buffer are reset before the processor can continue with the next packet.
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Figure 38: Maximum possible input rate for all normal packets to be forwarded
successfully
Figure 38 shows the maximum rate at which packets can be received by the network
processor system so that all normal packets are forwarded successfully. Only attack packets
are dropped by the processor, while all the regular packets are forwarded successfully. The
latency for the 100-byte packet is 24us while for 256-byte packet the latency is 104us.
When testing the throughput performance using larger packet sizes (512 bytes, 1500
bytes), the network processor does not forward the packets and the packets are lost. The
reason for this packet loss could be either of the following two cases below.
1. For the application used for testing throughput performance under attack (CM protocol),
the processor copies the packets to the data memory before forwarding the packets. The
data memory may not be sufficient for processing large packets. So we may need to look
at different applications to overcome this problem.
2. Packet generator sends packets to the network processor with a small inter packet delay.
Since CM application operates on the entire packet, the inter packet delay becomes
insufficient (as packet size increases) for the single core processor to effectively route the
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packets, resulting in packet loss.

A solution for this could be multi-core network

processors.
6.2.3. Resource Utilization
This section explains the different resource utilization details of our proposed network
processor system. The synthesis results were provided by Altera Quartus tool while the DFA
memory resource utilization details were provided by the offline analysis tool explained in
section 4.2.
6.2.3.1. Hash size and memory requirement
We initially explored the relation between hash size, DFA states, and state machine
memory requirement for three different hash sizes. Table 3 shows the relation between hash
size and DFA states. As hash size increases the probability of hash collision decreases (1/2h,
where h is the hash size), which reduces the number of DFA states. For example, for a three
bit hash, if the sum of instruction bits for the multiple active states on the output of a control
flow instruction in an NFA differ by a value of 8, we combine them to form a DFA state (e.g.,
if the sums are 2 and 10, then modulo 8 of both values is 2). When we move to higher hash
sizes, this hash collision is avoided and the DFA states get reduced. For the benchmarks
tested, most of the NFA states combined to form DFA have the same hash value, so they
remain even when we increase the hash size. For the few states where hash collisions are
avoided, we get a reduction in DFA states by increasing the hash size.
Table 4 shows the relationship between hash size and state machine memory.
Increasing the hash size increases the size of memory entries exponentially since the valid
hash values on outgoing edges field depends on hash size as explained in section 4.1. The
memory overhead increases by 42% as we move from three bit hash to four bit hash and by
56% as we move from four bit hash to five bit hash. Having a larger hash size reduces the
number of DFA states (probability of hash collision reduces) when the benchmark has a
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potentially large number of control flow instructions and memory accesses. We selected a
four bit hash for our proposed security monitoring system since it provides sufficiently low
collision probability (0.0625) without much memory overhead.

Benchmarks

NFA states

DFA states
Three bit hash

Four bit hash

Five bit hash

frag

573

594

592

591

red

802

808

808

807

ssld

828

836

836

833

wfq

905

921

921

918

mtc

2427

2460

2460

2459

Table 3: Hash size versus DFA states

Benchmarks NFA states

Three bit hash

Four bit hash

Five bit hash

Mem.

Mem.

Mem.

Mem.

Mem.

Mem.

entries

bits

entries

bits

entries

bits

frag

573

629

13209

627

18810

626

29422

red

802

857

17997

857

25710

854

40138

ssld

828

879

18459

879

26340

871

40937

wfq

905

980

20580

978

29340

969

45543

mtc

2427

2584

59432

2584

82688

2581

126469

Table 4: Hash size versus state machine memory
6.2.3.2. DFA versus NFA monitoring graph comparison
The results of generating instruction-level monitoring graphs for both our approach
and the previously mentioned approach in section 3.1 are illustrated in Table 5. The number
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of entries in the state machine memory is shown in the Mem. entries column. A clear benefit
of our proposed approach is speed. In all cases, only one access to the monitor memory is
required for any benchmark (including the five shown here). The previous NFA-based
approach requires up to three memory accesses for the benchmarks tested and potentially up
to 16 for other benchmarks. The conversion from NFA to a DFA does incur a memory
overhead of 7.7% on average for the benchmarks.

Chasaki[2]
Net.

No: of

NFA states

application instructions

Proposed system

Max mem.

DFA states

accesses

Mem.

Mem.

entries

overhead

frag

573

573

3

592

627

9.4%

red

802

802

2

808

857

6.8%

ssld

828

828

3

836

879

6.2%

wfq

905

905

2

921

978

8.0%

mtc

2427

2427

3

2460

2584

6.4%

Table 5: Evaluation of monitoring approaches for our proposed DFA approach and a
previous NFA approach.
6.2.3.3. Monitoring speed and resource utilization
The network processor system along with the security monitoring module was
successfully implemented on the DE4 platform. The lookup table (LUT), flip flop (FF), and
memory resources required for the single network processor core, monitor, and other
interface circuitry for the router (e.g. buffers, input arbiter, queuing control) are shown in
Table 6. The NP memory includes space for up to 4096 monitor memory entries. All circuitry
operated at 125 MHz, the same clock speed for the system without the monitor.
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Resources

Secure monitor

Network proc.

DE4 interface

Available

LUTs

140

3,792

37,803

182,400

FFs

26

2,120

38,444

182,400

Mem. bits

131,072

201,216

2,550,800

14,625,792

Table 6: Resource utilization for single core network processor system

The lookup table (LUT), flip flop (FF), and memory resources required for both our
approach and the previously mentioned approach in section 3.1 are illustrated in Table 7. The
security monitor memory includes space for up to 4096 memory entries. The DFA based
monitor has the advantage of evaluating 16 next states during every instruction cycle.

Resources

NFA based security
monitor (basic blocks)

DFA based security
monitor (4-bit hash)

LUTs

40

140

FFs

35

26

Memory bits

49,664

131,072

Table 7: Resource utilization comparison between NFA based and DFA based security
monitors

This chapter summarized the evaluation benchmarks and the experimental results
performed to test the functionality of our proposed network processor with the security
monitoring system. Next chapter concludes the thesis and provides future directions.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The thesis has outlined a new network processor architecture with a high-performance
security monitor for detecting in-network attacks. The network processor requires only a
single memory lookup per network processor instruction. This single memory lookup is
maintained regardless of the complexity of the network processor program using NFA-toDFA translation of the monitoring graph. Our monitor, which tracks individual processor
instructions, has been verified in hardware using a network processor with a Harvard
architecture. The presence of monitoring does not slow down the processor operation since it
is performed outside the operational paths of the processor.
The network processor with security monitoring system was implemented as part of
the Altera DE4 NetFPGA infrastructure. Results show that the throughput of the single-core
network processor system increases as the packet size increases. The network processor was
able to achieve line rate forwarding at packet size of 1500 bytes for IPV4 packet forwarding
application. We demonstrated the ability of our security monitor system to detect and recover
from network attacks without affecting the performance of the processor. Only the attack
packets get dropped, while the regular packets are forwarded successfully. We illustrated the
benefits of our security monitoring system over existing techniques in both memory access
and resource utilization. Our evaluation of hash size to memory resource requirement showed
that a four bit hash size provides sufficiently less collision probability without increasing the
memory overhead.
In the future, we plan to evaluate our monitoring approach using a multi-core network
processor. We also plan to look into the possibility of sharing monitoring logic between
different processor cores when they execute the same application. We hope that the
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developed security monitor framework will facilitate rapid design space exploration of
security monitor architectures for network processor systems.
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